

THE SPECIFICITY OF APPLYING THE TECHNOLOGY OF NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE IN THE POLITICAL RELATIONS (II): SPECIFIC FEATURES OF IMPLEMENTATION THE TECHNOLOGY OF REVOLUTION EXPORT ON THE TERRITORY OF FORMER USSR (GEORGIA, UKRAINE, KYRGYZSTAN)

Статтю присвячено аналізу специфіки використання технологій ненасильницького супротиву в рамках політико-владних відносин, зокрема аналізу ступеня її ефективності порівняно з озброєними повстаннями. Досліджено механізми формування та функціонування підпільних рухів, постановку головних завдань та стратегій реалізації антиурядових кампаній. Особливу увагу приділено пострадянському досвіду реалізації технології експорту революції на прикладі Грузії, України та Киргизстану.

Ключові слова: ненасильницький спротив, політична діяльність, підпільний рух.

Статья посвящена анализу специфики использования технологий ненасильственного сопротивления в рамках политико-властных отношений, а именно степени её эффективности сравнительно с вооруженными восстаниями. Исследуются механизмы формирования и функционирования подпольных движений, постановка главных задач и стратегий антиправительственных кампаний. Особенное внимание уделяется постсоветскому опыту реализации экспорта революции на примере Грузии, Украины и Киргизстан.

Ключевые слова: ненасильственное сопротивление, политическая деятельность, подпольное движение.

This paper focuses on the analyzing of the specificity of applying the technology of non-violent resistance within the framework of political relations. Namely the main goal of this article to research and compare level of efficiency which has the technology of nonviolent resistant with the same index of armed uprisings. There is studying the mechanisms of the underground movement functioning. Author also inquired posing the main goals and setting up entire strategy of anti-government campaign. Particular attention is paid to the post-Soviet experience implementing technology export revolution as an example of Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.

Key words: non-violent resistance, political activities, underground movement.

Statement of the problem.

The problem of abandonment of weapons and casualties in the pursuit of their own interests and conflict resolution needs careful study. Particular attention should be paid so-called «velvet revolution» that, although from a theoretical point of view, and represent a problem within the methodological analysis of the concept of "revolution" instead of the applied position – is striking manifestations of manufacturing operations with clearly defined effective properties which are not vary by country and situational characteristics. Historical continuation of «velvet» revolutions were «color revolutions». Since the late XX – early XXI century became known as any change of the political regime or even the government as

a result of massive popular protests. Thus, the removal of the president Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia as a result of events in 2003 called «Rose Revolution», the coming to power of Viktor Yushchenko as a result of a campaign of protest against the official results of the presidential election in Ukraine – «Orange Revolution», the removal of the A. Akayev during a large-scale riot that broke out after the 2005 general elections in Kyrgyzstan, the results of which, according to the opposition, was rigged – «tulip Revolution». It features relevant transformation processes in the above named countries, and this article is dedicated.

Analysis of researches and publications.

The analysis of sources relating to the abovementioned problem can be stated that a significant number of them

are not sufficiently informative and impartial. The most systematically solved the issue in the writings of G. Sharp «From dictatorship to democracy» [6] «Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System» [5]. In his books, Gene Sharp provides specific guidelines for action, describes the logic influence the dictatorship, reveals its strengths and weaknesses. The main attention is paid to strategic planning, working with the public and the international community. Recommendations for measures to prevent the emergence of a new dictatorship after the overthrow of the old.

Quite content were revealed the cause of the phenomenon of non-violent revolutions in the S. Karakurumza «export of revolution. Yushchenko, Saakashvili» [3]. Details revealed history of «velvet revolutions» and the mechanisms of their functioning, methods and the impact on the population to implement anti-government sentiment and their implementation in action.

You should also pay attention to the work of William Enhdalya «Century of War: Anglo-American Politics and the New World Order» [1]. American political scientist underlines a significant role in the development of internet technology as a factor that increases the efficiency of synchronization and anti-government activities. A similar problem reveals in his book «Time networking revolutions» A. Ivanovsky [2], emphasizing the crucial role of online blogs and portals in the operational organization of anti-government activities.

The aim of the article is to reveal features of implementation of export revolution in the former Soviet Union as an example of Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.

The main material.

First of all, it should be noted that the list of selected countries is conditioned by the fact of complete implementation of technology export revolutions that brought about a deep social and political transformation in selected countries.

First on the list of successfully implemented coups (along with Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan), the Georgian «Rose Revolution» – is a nonviolent operation aimed to offset Eduard Shevardnadze. There is reason to believe that the events in Georgia in 2003 is part of the U.S. strategy to control the supply of Azerbaijani oil. William Engdahl on this occasion said: «since the days of the Clinton administration U. Washington supported all the proposals for the construction of an independent control of the Russian oil pipeline from Baku through Tbilisi next to the Black Sea and then to the Turkish Ceyhan» [7, p. 272]. William Engdahl notes on immutability (since the early 1990's,) U.S. strategy in relation to Azerbaijan : «Friendly America president Heydar Aliyev, a former functionary in the Soviet era Politburo, was the presidency of the hands of the same person who stay in the U.S. ambassador in their respective countries, was responsible for directing «Rose Revolution» in Georgia in 2003, operations of the Serbian «Otpor!» in 2000 and «orange» revolution in Ukraine in 2004 – Richard Miles. During the revolution of 1992, which brought Aliyev to power, Miles was ambassador in Azerbaijan» [7].

Despite the loyalty of Eduard Shevardnadze to the White House, the United States engaged in the preparation of the new Georgian elite that their plan, was to take power only from American hands. Washington

was elected Saakashvili, a graduate of Columbia University. Working in the New York law firm «Patterson, Belknap, Webb & Tyler» (in Georgia, the company has become a corporate partner of the youth organization «Kmara»), which provides legal support to U.S. oil and gas projects in Russia, Saakashvili learned to practice certain aspects of the former Soviet economy who were interested in America. Over time, this aspect of his biography committed against other compatriots who were educated in American universities. Which at that time was enough: "In the 1990s America has invested in the Georgian elite" agenda billion dollars officially selected to stabilize the budget" [4, p. 93]. In the summer of 2003 when Eduard Shevardnadze on the relevant agreement actually gave «Gazprom» and RAO UES of control of gas – and electricity distribution networks Georgia, Saakashvili has put America at the forefront of the revolutionary movement.

Impact strength of the Georgian revolution was built in the style of the Serbian event 2000: specialized organization established in 2002 to change the government, was «Kmara» held in special training camps financed by the United States on the territory of Serbia. Financing «Kmara» carried through the Soros Foundation, the disposal of which was also the TV channel «Rustavi-2» [9].

The symbol of the revolution was the red rose, signifying Christianity is love, purity and holiness. The present image of the opposition wanted to show their difference from the current regime, which, according to their statements, mired in violence, fraud and corruption.

Opponents of Eduard Shevardnadze realized the wide range of non-violent actions: strikes, boycott of elections, starvation, violent occupation, the idea of false documents, blocking information lines, removal of road signs, refusal to pay taxes, abandonment of office and work with the government. All of these actions exactly match the recommendations of Albert Einstein, insistute which, staying in the shade, functioned quality think-tank operations. Conductor «Rose Revolution» was the State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi, the Soros Foundation, Freedom House, USAID, the Republican and Democratic parties, acting through the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute.

After the start of a campaign event spreads quickly: November 2, 2003, after the elections to the Parliament of Georgia, the CEC announced the victory of the pro-government bloc «For a United Georgia». TV Company «Rustavi-2» states that according to exit poll block Saakashvili won the «National Movement». November 21 the U.S. State Department calls a rigged election in Georgia, the day after the announcement in Tbilisi organized fifty thousandth meeting, members of which burst in the first session of parliament during a speech by E. Shevardnadze. November 23 Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov urges Shevardnadze leave Georgia to avoid bloodshed, and the Supreme Court annuls the election results. Shevardnadze resigns and Acting becoming president Nino Burjanadze. In the next presidential elections held in January 2003 Saakashvili gaining 96 % of the votes and became the new head of state.

In general, the coup in Georgia demonstrated the unwillingness of government agencies to confront non-violent operations that are sold to the accompaniment of

the English and American media in the broadest sense – the 'soft power' USA. However, despite the «velvet sheath» regime change, the outcome was far from non-violent principles: the new Georgian leader took the line into open confrontation with Moscow, which resulted in the fighting in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which forced the Russian government to restore power balance in the region [9].

Georgia, despite the traditional ties with Russia, in fact incorporated in western-style management, in particular, manifested in the displacement of the Russian language in English. Americans, ignoring special interests in the Caucasus themselves fill the information vacuum in the former Soviet republic. Connectivity U.S., partially implemented during the «Rose Revolution», create, according to S. Kara-Murza new realities «of social consciousness, a deep and prolonged crisis of ideology: people become a crowd, even in the comfort of their apartments, he atomizuyetsya and loses the ability to maintain a stable position, even at a small threat of defeat power is rapidly and people outside unjustifiably moves to the side of the party, «whose is» [8, p. 208].

Turning to the analysis of the «orange revolution» in Ukraine, which peaked in October -December 2004, should pay attention to earlier events that have produced domestic political changes. Attention American political traced to Ukraine since the beginning of 2000, when non-governmental organizations held a «Ukraine without Kuchma», uniting under his banner wide protest Diverse sectors and political forces from nationalistst to anarchists. During this operation the U.S. nonviolent control technology rehearsed street masses and political pressure on the government, once again discredit President Leonid Kuchma.

The goal of U.S. policy was presented to the public by former U.S. Secretary of State M. Albright in early 2004, «the United States no matter who will become president of Ukraine, but we are very interested in the question of how to be won by this victory» [2, p. 95]. The Americans had already openly declared that the choice is due. Bid was made for Yushchenko, whose candidacy actively lobbied by his wife K. Chumatchenko who worked a long time in the U.S. State Department and the Department of Foreign Relations of the White House.

Growth accrue election campaign in early April 2004, when it felt the two main contenders for the presidency: V. Yanukovich and Yushchenko.

At first initiative by pro-government forces: the beginning of 2004, the vast majority of TV channels, electronic and print media are under the control of the authorities. February 17, 2004 was stopped broadcasting popular programs of Radio «Free Europe» / Radio «Liberty» in Ukrainian, which was conducted in a private range online radio «Trust». The government tried to block the propaganda campaign from the outside, which could seriously disrupt the plans of the coup supporters. For their support of M. Albright, who visited Ukraine in early March, making a meaningful statement: «We need to strengthen the support of independent media and civil society, which require considerable financial expenses and a democratic neighboring countries of Ukraine, which could provide objective transmission Media centers to train people involved in voter mobilization and monitoring» [2, p. 96].

In other words, M. Albright confirms the intention of the U.S. Administration to take not formally part in the electoral process in Ukraine in 2004.

In these events involved the same organization as in the days of «Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia in 2000 and Georgia in 2003 financed protest movement: the National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute, the U.S. Information Agency, the Agency for International Development, Freedom House, the Soros Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. These organizations have funded «Time» and its affiliated organizations. They received funds through the «Praveks Bank» and «Western Union». Acknowledging in December 2004, a fact providing material support to the leader of Ukrainian opposition member of the House of Representatives R. Paul, said that the money for the opposition went through a «Polish-American-Ukrainian Cooperation Initiative» (PAUCI), who guided the U.S. Freedom House. PAUCI in turn translated public money to numerous Ukrainian non-governmental organizations. According to the head of the International Republican Institute L. Kraner, since 2002 the U.S. State Department gave the Ukrainian opposition more than 65 million dollars through various NGOs. As one of the links, it is called the Eurasia Foundation, the financing of which the Agency for International Development.

The main character actor «Orange Revolution» was a movement «Pora», created by analogue Serbian «Otpor!» and Georgian «Kmara». «Time» appeared in July 2004 by merging 340 regional and national associations. The core of the «Seasons» was the National Liberal Union «Freedom of Choice». Souped organization supported by such major nationalist groups like UNA-UNSD.

A few rally on Independence Square began immediately after the vote, but in November 24, 2004, after the Central Election Commission preliminary results, according to which the defeated rival Yushchenko – Yanukovich, the opposition called on all its supporters to start indefinite rally. Yushchenko supporters, as well as in his time, a team of Saakashvili, have relied on 124 nonviolent method of struggle – the boycott of the elections. Deployed encampment, which, according to S. Kara- Murza, «while there were 2-3 thousand people, on the first day there was about 200 tents for the next three are about 300» [8, p. 240].

Spent carefully in Serbia and Georgia, nonviolent action literally paralyzed Ukraine. Tent cities are symbolically important in areas of the capital – the central square and near government buildings, reflecting the 173 th and 183 th methods of nonviolent struggle («non-violent occupation» and «non-violent mastery of the earth»), described by G. Sharp in his writings. Organizing numerous rock concerts and performances Ukrainian stars (36 Sharp method – «staging and music»), citizens, subject to the influence of The NATO often joined the ranks of the protesters. Psychological and physiological features of the people that are inherent in every human being, have been used to full capacity.

The symbol under which Ukrainian opposition unified, was the color orange, which, prior to the action on Independence Square, was the rush of the population in the item of clothing or accessory (before the second round – all Kyiv, Kyiv thousands of trees – were

decorated with orange ribbons. Then the orange symbols Yushchenko added: horseshoe logo with happiness inscription «Yes» and orange, which gave its supporters and opponents of each other. Thus, political strategists have adopted 7 logos, cartoons and characters, 8 «flags, posters and visual aids», 18 «hanging flags and symbolic colors» and 19 «the wearing of symbols» methods of nonviolent action [10].

The opposition gained support among senior «of international mediators» – EU High Commissioner for Foreign Policy and Security Javier Solana, Secretary General of the OSCE J. Kubis, President of Poland Alexander Kwasniewski and Lithuanian and V. Adamkus. The actions of these politicians reinforce confidence Yushchenko team that uses the appeal of «soft power» the U.S. and the EU to improve its image in the eyes of the Ukrainian people and world public opinion.

As a result of a bitter struggle for power, expressed in many non-violent actions, as well as pressure from outside (including financial investments in foreign bank accounts of senior Ukrainian officials), the Supreme Court of Ukraine adopts a decision to reconduct of the presidential elections, which resulted in 10 January 2005 President country was said. Held on January 23 inauguration of the new president, after which (25 January) tent protesters in the center of Kyiv were removed.

Non-violent coup ended with success in Kyrgyzstan. Similar attempts of regime change could be observed in Belarus, Uzbekistan, Armenia and Azerbaijan, but in those States government was stable and ready to use military force – something that lacked A. Akaev. As in the case of Georgia and Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan revolutionary transformation began in the electoral period: February – March 2005 were held the next parliamentary elections, the results of which were unrecognized by observers from the OSCE and the European Parliament 124 method – «boycott elections».

Oran called «Tulip Revolution» researchers attributed most A. Akayev, who wanted to call this phrase analogy with the events in Georgia and Ukraine, to emphasize American participation [9].

Given the clan structure of society, their mutual hatred and fight for property developments, even for the Americans took an unexpected direction: had committed a series of political assassinations, and peaceful demonstrations are often passed in pogroms and mass clashes with police. The condition of non-violent discipline, by G. Sharp is the foundation for any successful operation, was not observed. Meanwhile, the opposition can not blame in complete ignorance of nonviolent methods. Thus, in accordance with the decision taken at the meeting in Jalal-Abad March 15 opponents Akayev created parallel to the official government management – Coordination Council of People's Unity of Kyrgyzstan (KSNEK), which coincides exactly with the recommendations of Gene

Sharp, in particular, with its 198 method – «dual sovereignty and parallel government» [10].

April 3 is the opposition goal: after talks between Akayev and the speaker of the new parliament O. Tekebayevym in Moscow, signed a protocol on the early resignation of President «according to his own statement»

As often happens in history, the new rulers that are replacing the old, rarely better, often they do not even bother to attempt to eradicate the causes of social unrest, not to mention the technique of nonviolent struggle against the coup. Has escaped this fate and K. Bakiev: coming to power in 2005. after A. Akayev, has lost his job in April 2010 after a similar coup. Accusing his predecessor of corruption, despotism, social and economic polarization of the rich north and the poor south. And eventually the government Bakiyev was overthrown by the accompanying of these same slogans.

The success of the U.S. policy of regime change in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan is supported by the fact that marked the Asian countries dominated the type of leadership. The essence of this type is that the entire state system is locked on one person depends on his will and sentiments, no restraining and guiding force in the face of the aristocracy or oligarchy. He has a yard and close that just follow the instructions. Simply put, the ruling class – he himself sole master. Deriving such a leader of the ruling system through revolution, the director destroys the entire system. In Western countries, non-violent displacement of the president or the prime minister would be a change of scenery, because decisions are not made by these people, and the financial aristocracy. However, we can say that the situation has changed somewhat in Ukraine since 2010, after his election to the presidency of Viktor Yanukovich – you can watch the concentration of power is in the hands of the financial aristocracy. The higher echelons of power were limited political actors in Ukraine [10, p. 198].

Conclusions.

The success of the U.S. policy of regime change in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan is supported by the fact that marked the Asian countries dominated the type of leadership. The essence of this type is that the entire state system is locked on one person depends on his will and sentiments, no restraining and guiding force in the face of the aristocracy or oligarchy. He has a yard and close that just follow the instructions. Simply put, the ruling class – he himself sole master. Deriving such a leader of the ruling system through revolution, the director destroys the entire system. In Western countries, non-violent displacement of the president or the prime minister would be a change of scenery, because decisions are not made by these people, and the financial aristocracy. However, we can say that the situation has changed somewhat in Ukraine since 2010, after his election to the presidency of Viktor Yanukovich – you can watch the concentration of power is in the hands of the financial aristocracy.

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